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Equal Treatment for Newcomers: The Core 
Meaning of National and State Citizenship 
Wi//iam Cohen* 
9 
The most ubiquitous form of constitutional commentary 
combines despair over the Supreme Court's reasoning with a 
claim to have discovered a sensible pattern in its results. I have 
not made a unique discovery in my conclusion that the Court's 
doctrinal explanations for the validity or invalidity of durational 
residency tests are in disarray. But I think that the holdings have 
a sensible, simple, and coherent explanation, preferable to those 
that the Court has offered. 
I. SHAPIRO v. THOMPSON: THE FIRST WRONG STEP 
The constitutional law of durational residency requirements 
begins with Shapiro v. Thompson. 1 So does the confusion. The 
Court held that one-year durational residency requirements for 
payment of welfare benefits were a denial of equal protection. 
That conclusion, in tum, rested on the argument that the waiting 
period interfered with the recipients' "fundamental right" of inter-
state travel, triggering strict scrutiny of state interests proffered as 
justification. The states' attempts to discourage migration of indi-
gents attracted by generous welfare benefits were as illegitimate as 
closing state borders to all indigents would be. The border-closing 
policy was not simply a state interest of insufficient weight-it was 
a denial of the existence of the right itself. Another asserted state 
interest-distinguishing between old and new residents on the ba-
sis of their past contributions to the community-was equally im-
permissible. The invalidity of this interest, however, could not be 
tied to denial of the right to travel. The Court's conclusory rea-
soning was that "[t]he Equal Protection Clause prohibits such an 
apportionment of state services."2 A final cluster of asserted state 
interests, based on "administrative and related governmental 
objectives,''3 failed because they were of insufficient weight. Clas-
sifications touching on the fundamental right of interstate move-
• Professor of Law. Stanford University. 
I. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
2. ld at 633. 
3. fd 
9 
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ment could be justified only by compelling state interests-<>nes 
beyond mere administrative convenience. Particularly, the argu-
ment that a one-year durational residency requirement was a good 
rule of thumb for determining residency could not "withstand 
scrutiny." 
Two aspects of the Shapiro opinion were sure to cause 
trouble. First, the Court's unsupported conclusion that the equal 
protection clause forbids the allocation of state services to long-
term residents needed elaboration. Why aren't the past contribu-
tions of the old-timers an adequate justification? And how, if at 
all, does this ruling relate to the Court's principal right-to-travel 
theme? In the case of indigents, it was plausible to argue that a 
one year hiatus in reception of welfare benefits made migration to 
a new state practically impossible. But that rationale would allow 
the state to bar new arrivals--even indigent ones-from other 
state services such as public libraries. It seems unlikely that this 
was the Court's intention. We are thus left to speculate about why 
states cannot favor long-term residents over recent arrivals in the 
allocation of state services. Some sort of fundamental right must 
be at stake. This seems to follow from the Court's rejection of the 
strong administrative convenience argument in Shapiro. If the 
state can limit largess from its treasury to bona fide residents, and 
if residence turns on subjective intention, a durational residency 
test designed to weed out those with no intent to remain hardly 
seems irrational. And, if no fundamental right is at stake, it is 
hard to see why the Constitution requires the "less drastic means" 
of case-by-case scrutiny of domiciliary intent. 
II. PENALIZING THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL 
The Court's next encounters with durational residency re-
quirements added a new layer of complexity to the analysis. Dunn 
v. Blumstein4 invalidated lengthy durational residency require-
ments for voting. Significantly, the Court's opinion did not end 
with its rationale pegged to the voting right cases, but went on to 
support the result under the right to travel analysis of Shapiro. 
How could a durational residency requirement for voting burden 
the right to interstate travel, when no one seriously argued that 
anyone would defer a move because of temporary exclusion from 
the franchise? The less than obvious answer was that Shapiro 
didn't rest, after all, on the proposition that durational residency 
requirements for welfare were intended to deter, or in fact de-
4. 405 U.S. 330 (1972). 
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terred, travel. The actual plaintiffs in Shapiro had not been de-
terred from moving. The gist of their constitutional complaint 
was that the states had penalized the exercise of the right to travel, 
because a durational residency requirement operates to exclude 
only those who exercise the right of interstate migration. 
The penalty rationale became the centerpiece of the decision 
in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, s invalidating a one-year 
residency requirement for free medical care. Arizona made the 
predictable argument that indigents were not likely to be deterred 
from migrating to Arizona by the knowledge that non-emergency 
medical care would not be provided in their first year there. The 
Court began its response with the proposition that the right to 
travel had been involved in Shapiro in "only a limited sense."6 
The right at issue was the right to migrate, with a permanent in-
tent to settle. Nor was the question limited to an inquiry whether 
temporary denial of benefits deterred exercise of the right. Strict 
scrutiny was triggered by durational residency requirements that 
were a penalty for recent interstate migration. Whether a dura-
tiona! residency requirement for receipt of state benefits was a 
penalty depended on the nature of the benefit. If the benefit de-
nied was a "basic necessity of life,"? a durational residency re-
quirement was a penalty. 
The penalty rationale had an implicit negative pregnant. If a 
state denied services to newcomers, strict scrutiny was not re-
quired if migration was not deterred, and the services were not 
"basic necessities of life." The negative side of the penalty ration-
ale could explain the Court's dictum a year earlier, in nandis v. 
Kline, s that a one-year durational residency requirement for lower 
in-state tuition in a state university was permissible. But it hardly 
explained the holding in nandis that Connecticut's rule freezing 
students in out-of-state status during their college careers for tui-
tion purposes was invalid. In reaching that result, the Court had 
abandoned equal protection analysis for a puzzling procedural 
due process rationale. Since the state purported to be concerned 
with residency, it was procedurally unfair to prevent students 
from proving that they had become residents, by creating an ir-
rebutable presumption of non-residency. 
5. 415 u.s. 250 (1974). 
6. ld at 255. 
7. ld at 259. 
8. 412 U.S. 441,452-53 (1973). The dictum was supported by two earlier decisions. 
Starns v. Malkerson. 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970). ajf'd mem. 401 U.S. 985 (1971); 
Kirk v. Board of Regents. 273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 28 Cal. Rptr. 260 (Ct. App. 1969), appeal 
dismissed, 396 U.S. 554 (1970). 
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After the Court's brief love affair with irrebutable presump-
tions had come to an end,9 it was tempting to dismiss the holding 
in Vlandis as an aberration. It appeared that constitutional law 
concerning residency requirements had run its course-that they 
were invalid only when imposed as tests for voting and for vital 
state services for indigents. The broad, and unexplained, state-
ment in Shapiro that the equal protection clause prohibits giving 
greater state services to long-time residents seemed to be a mu-
seum piece. 
That impression was fortified by the result in Sosna v. Iowa, to 
where a one-year residency requirement for bringing divorce ac-
tions against non-residents was upheld. The one unusual feature 
of that opinion was that it scrupulously avoided the penalty ra-
tionale, which could have supported the result. Justice Rehnquist 
explained that previous cases striking down durational residency 
requirements had been those in which the only justifications as-
serted were "budgetary or recordkeeping considerations."•• Du-
rational residency requirements that further other kinds of 
interests-here Iowa's concern that it not become a divorce mill-
would be upheld. If Sosna's opinion were taken seriously, even 
the stripped-down rationale of Memorial Hospital and Vlandis 
would be in jeopardy. 
Perhaps it is fortunate that Sosna marked the beginning of 
the Court's sabbatical on the durational residency issue. For 
seven years, Court watchers were spared the pain of reading one 
more case that explained that the rationale of the previous cases 
wasn't quite right, and added one more layer of tar to the analyti-
cal highway. Hope sprang eternal that, refreshed from its seven 
years of repose, the Court would supply some sensible and pre-
dictable approach to the riddle of durational residency 
requirements. 
III. THE ALASKA OIL BONUS CASE 
Ronald and Patricia Zobel were "Cheechakos," a not entirely 
neutral term applied by Alaskans to newcomers. They made their 
welcome to Alaska less hospitable by bringing suit to challenge 
two 1980 measures designed to give long-term Alaskans a dispro-
portionate share of the state's oil wealth. First was a measure giv-
9. See, e.g., Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co .. 428 U.S. I (1976); Weinberger v. 
Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975). But cf. Turner v. Department of Employment. 423 U.S. 44 
(1975). 
10. 419 U.S. 393 (1975). 
II. /d at 406. 
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ing residents a one-third exemption from state income taxes for 
each year of residence, operating to excuse anyone with three or 
more years of residence from payment. Second, and more signifi-
cant, was a measure distributing a portion of Alaska's mineral in-
come fund earnings to state citizens, with varying amounts based 
on length of residence. (One dividend unit-worth $50 in 1980-
was paid to each adult Alaskan for each year of residency after 
1959.) Since the Zobels had lived in Alaska only since 1978, they 
were required to pay some income tax, and were scheduled tore-
ceive only a small payment from the fund. 
After listening to an oral argument carried on live television 
throughout the state, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that 
the income-tax-forgiveness provisions were invalid under the 
Alaska Constitution, but that the fund payment structure violated 
neither the state nor the Federal Constitution.12 The decisions 
were by shifting 3-2 votes, with only one justice in the majority in 
both cases. Significantly, the court began with the understandable 
assumption that neither measure triggered strict scrutiny under 
the Federal Constitution, since new residents were not deterred 
from moving to Alaska, and were not being denied vital state 
services. It applied, however, an intermediate level of scrutiny 
under the state constitution. The tax measure did not survive that 
scrutiny, but the fund payment provisions did-at least in the eyes 
of Chief Justice Rabinowitz, who cast the deciding vote in both 
cases. 
Before the United States Supreme Court, Alaska could argue 
confidently that distinctions based on length of residence, for dis-
tribution of non-vital state benefits, need only be "minimally ra-
tional." Awarding larger payments to older residents served three 
purposes. Most important, it encouraged Alaskans not to vote for 
immediate distribution of the fund. (If any distributions had to be 
shared equally with future newcomers, present residents would be 
tempted to increase their share by requiring larger current distri-
butions.) Second, with increased benefits for each year of resi-
dence, there would be an incentive for Alaskans to remain in the 
State to reap the increased benefits. Finally, the benefit scheme 
rewarded long-time residents for their past contributions. 
In rejecting Alaska's arguments, Chief Justice Burger's opin-
ion for the Court in Zobel v. Williams 13 found that it was unneces-
sary to challenge Alaska's assumption that the law need meet only 
the test of minimal rationality, because the "scheme cannot pass 
12. Williams v. Zobel, 619 P.2d 422 (Alaska 1980). 
13. 102 S. Ct. 2309 (1982). 
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even the minimal test."t4 The problem with Alaska's first two ar-
guments was that both objectives could have been adequately at-
tained by merely granting greater dividends for years of residency 
after enactment of the measure, without also crediting years of 
past residence going back to the year of statehood of Alaska. The 
final objective-rewarding past contributions-was, obviously, 
served well by the challenged statutory classification. That objec-
tive, however, was not legitimate at all. 
It should be obvious that the decision marks a sharp break 
with the apparent pattern established by the earlier durational 
residency cases. It is just as obvious that the rationale is even 
more opaque than that supplied by the string of previous opin-
ions.ts It was not necessary for Alaska to extend its residence 
preference back twenty-one years to encourage Alaskans not to 
dissipate the oil funds, or to stay in the State, but the lack of that 
necessity hardly demonstrates irrationality. Chief Justice Burger 
stated that the Alaska Supreme Court had itself concluded that 
the retroactive awarding of residence seniority was not rationally 
related to the asserted objectives.t6 That court, however, was op-
erating on the assumption that its state constitution required more 
than minimal rationality. On that analysis, giving greater rewards 
to those who had been in the state longest required a special justi-
fication. Whether strict scrutiny was required by the United 
States Constitution was an issue the Chief Justice purported not to 
reach.t 7 
The heart of the opinion nevertheless required more than 
minimal scrutiny, because it concluded that rewarding past contri-
butions to the state is not a permissible objective. The Chief Jus-
tice relied on the unexplained dictum in Shapiro v. Thompson that 
the equal protection clause forbids apportionment of state benefits 
on the basis of length of residency.ts The reach of that dictum is, 
indeed, expanded with a paragraph suggesting that durational 
residency requirements for payment of state services will almost 
always be unconstitutional. 
If the States can make the amount of a cash dividend depend on length of resi-
14. !d at 2313. 
15. The Chief Justice masked a major constitutional change with an ostensible ra-
tional basis scrutiny in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). See also Richmond Newspapers. 
Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Fullilove v. K.lutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). 
16. Zobel, 102 S. Ct. at 2313. 
17. !d 
18. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 632-33. The Zobel opinion also relied on a statement in 
Vlandis that apportionment of tuition rates on the basis of duration of residency would 
give rise to "grave" equal protection problems. 412 U.S. at 450 n.6. 
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dence, what would preclude varying university tuition on a sliding scale based on 
years of residence-or even limiting access to finite public facilities. eligibility for 
student loans, for civil service jobs, or for government contracts by length of dom-
icile? Could States impose different taxes based on length of residence? Alaska's 
reasoning could open the door to state apportionment of other rights, benefits and 
services according to length of residency. It would permit the states to divide 
citizens into expanding numbers of permanent classes. Such a result would be 
clearly impermissible.19 
15 
As Justice Rehnquist observed in his solo dissent, none of this 
is the stuff of minimal scrutiny. States cannot constitutionally re-
ward longer residence with greater benefits. Other justifications 
for accomplishing that result obviously need to be washed in acid. 
But where does the constitutional right to equal treatment, that 
the Zobels had successfully vindicated, come from? 
To their credit, five Justices, including four who had con-
curred in the Court's opinion, tried to offer further enlightenment. 
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion, joined by three other Jus-
tices, retains much of the structure of his opinion for the Court in 
Shapiro v. Thompson. The beginning of the analysis is still inter-
state mobility: "[l]f each State were free to reward its citizens in-
crementally for their years of residence, . . . a citizen leaving one 
State would thereby forfeit his accrued seniority, only to have to 
begin building such seniority again in his new state of resi-
dence."2o As in Shapiro, the distinct conclusion that it is illegiti-
mate to reward citizens for past contributions rests on another 
ground: "[T]he acknowledged illegitimacy of that state purpose 
has a different heritage-it reflects not the structure of the Federal 
Union but the idea of constitutionally protected equality."21 
One cannot quarrel with Justice Brennan's evident desire for 
some firmer ground than interference with interstate movement. 
For as Justice Rehnquist pointed out in dissent, it is difficult to 
believe that Alaska's scheme of giving more money to earlier resi-
dents would affect anyone's decision to move to Alaska. In fact, 
Alaska's scheme of paying out its riches might attract newcomers 
to Alaska, although concededly not as many as equal shares for 
newcomers. (It would attract more newcomers than wasteful 
spending of Alaska's oil riches!) 
The second rationale completely abandons the mobility mo-
tif, but employs a more puzzling theme of equality. Surely, the 
problem is not one of a generalized principle requiring equal per 
capita distribution of the state treasury. Some principle is operat-
19. Zobel, 102 S. Ct. at 2314-15 (footnotes omitted). 
20. /d at 2317. 
21. ld 
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ing here that is irrelevant when the state decides to favor its farm-
ers over its mechanics, or to redistribute income from the young to 
the old. 
Justice O'Connor's separate concurrence is novel, and the 
most interesting opinion in the set. Her criticisms of the Court's 
opinion apply, at least in part, to Justice Brennan's opinion as 
well. Is it truly illegitimate to reward citizens for their past contri-
butions, even ifthe reward is not graded by years of past residency 
in the state? If that is the only illegitimate purpose, will states be 
able to conjure up other purposes to support schemes giving 
greater benefits to long-term residents? 
Justice O'Connor would have rested the decision on the privi-
leges and immunities clause of article IV. Initially, that looks like 
a curious location for constitutional attack against durational resi-
dency requirements. Both the Court,22 and Justice Rehnquist,23 
observed that article IV applies to distinctions between state citi-
zens and citizens of other states-not to distinctions among a 
state's citizens. Moreover, the state privileges and benefits that 
have been involved in durational residency cases are concededly 
those that a state can limit to its own citizens. Justice O'Connor's 
answer is that a right of citizens of states other than Alaska is im-
plicated by the right to move to Alaska and settle. "Each group of 
citizens who migrated to Alaska in the past, or chooses to move 
there in the future, lives in the State on less favorable terms than 
those who arrived earlier."24 Invoking article IV jurisprudence, 
Justice O'Connor argued that Alaska could not choose to give 
lesser benefits to new residents unless new residents were the "pe-
culiar source" of the evil addressed by the disbursement scheme, 
and the disbursement scheme bore a substantial relationship to 
curing that malady.2s 
Zobel has, happily, rescued the constitutional law of dura-
tiona! residency requirements from the limbo to which Justice 
Rehnquist's opinion in Sosna threatened to consign it. There is a 
substantial, and reliable, constitutional right of newcomers to in-
sist on an equal share of state benefits and services. At the same 
time, we know that some durational residency requirements-in-
cluding those for bringing a divorce action and paying lower in-
state tuition in a state university-will be upheld. The doctrinal 
22. Jd at 2312 n.5. Four of the Justices who joined the opinion. however, also joined 
in a concurrence that characterized Justice O'Connor's anicle IV theory as "plausible." Id 
at 2316. 
23. Jd at 2325. n.3. 
24. Jd at 2321. 
25. /d 
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cacophony in Zobel makes it difficult to predict whether dura-
tiona! residency requirements will be upheld in contexts not ad-
dressed by the Court, and what are the appropriate bases of 
decision. 
IV. EQUAL STATE CITIZENSHIP FOR NEWCOMERS 
The only hope for analysis is a new beginning, abandoning /-
the doctrinal false leads of burdens or penalties on the right to 
travel or migrate, equal protection, and strict scrutiny. The new 
citizen's right to equality depends on none of those things. It is 
important, at the outset, to remember that the problem has arisen 
in the context of state privileges and benefits that the state can 
limit to its own citizens. Such discrimination between citizens and 
non-citizens is permitted despite the prima facie command of arti-
cle IV's privileges and immunities clause, requiring equality of 
treatment between state citizens and citizens of other states. The 
obvious explanation is that the reality of the existence of states 
qua states, rather than as departments of a national government, 
requires a conception that the state's citizens own state-owned re-
sources, and that a state is not required to share its treasury with 
the nation at large.26 
The states' power to limit the distribution of community-
owned resources to members of the community is subject to an 
obvious corollary. One aspect of full sovereignty denied to the 
states is the power to determine membership in the community. 
Under the fourteenth amendment, any United States citizen be-
comes a full-fledged member of the state community immediately 
upon establishing residence there. (If forced to find a constitu-
tional text as the home for this concept, I would elect the privi-
leges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment. 
Whatever rights may attach to the conception of United States 
citizenship, the least controversial should be that of free choice of 
state citizenship.) A state's decision that old-timers deserve a 
greater share of state-owned resources cannot be squared with a 
constitutional structure that demands that newcomers be treated 
as full members of the state community. 
The strict scrutiny-equal protection approach of Shapiro sug-
gests that there are competing policies that will be sufficiently 
weighty to override the constitutional command of equality for 
26. Justice Brennan remarked, in his concurrence, that permitting states to offer bene-
fits and services to their citizens "inheres in the very idea of maintaining the States as 
independent sovereigns." ld at 2317. For an excellent and detailed exposition. see Varat. 
State "Citizenship" and Interstate Equali~l'. 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 487 (1981). 
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newcomers. Similarly, Justice O'Connor's article IV structure al-
lows newcomers to be given second class status if they are sources 
of an "evil" that can be corrected by denying them benefits. (She 
explains Sosna on the ground that granting divorces to newcomers 
might tempt other states to refuse recognition to divorce decrees 
granted those new residents.) Such balancing of interests is inap-
propriate in this context. A constitutional structure demanding 
equality for new citizens cannot yield to competing substantive 
policies, any more than can the constitutional command that all 
persons born in the United States are citizens of the United States 
and citizens of the state in which they reside. 
The validity of a state durational residency requirement does 
not depend on whether there are exceptions to the principle of 
equality for newcomers. It rests on the correlative principle that 
there are state benefits that can be limited to citizens. There is a 
substantial problem in the dependency of residency, the constitu-
tional test for state citizenship, on a mental state. If the benefit is 
sufficiently large, the state can legitimately be concerned that non-
citizens are asserting false claims. There are situations where a 
durational residency requirement fits quite nicely with paired con-
stitutional conceptions that benefits can be limited to a state's citi-
zens, but that newly arrived citizens are entitled to full equality. 
On the other hand, an assertion by the state that its durational 
residency requirement is a test for bona fide citizenship must be 
acid-washed to insure that it is not a pretext for discriminating 
against new arrivals in the distribution of benefits. 
Applying that approach, the results reached by the Court are 
plausible. Zobel is the easiest case, since Alaska's twenty-one 
classes of citizens cannot be justified as a scheme to test honesty of 
domiciliary intent. Counsel asserted in Shapiro that the dura-
tiona! residency test was a means of insuring accuracy of the resi-
dency determination, but the Court properly disbelieved this 
explanation. It was, suspiciously, an alternative pleading to the 
contention that the purpose of the test was to fence out indigents. 
Moreover, most indigent applicants for welfare are in no position 
to make temporary sojourns for the purpose of picking up welfare 
checks, and welfare payments are made only after individual in-
vestigation of the applicant's living situation. On the other side of 
the coin, it is easy to approve a one-year durational residency re-
quirement for paying in-state tuition at a state university. The dif-
ferences between out-of-state and in-state tuition are substantial, 
and domiciliary intent is a particularly difficult factual issue in the 
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case of college students.27 
Other cases may be more problematic. If the questions are 
whether, in a particular context, the durational residency period is 
too long, or whether a system of case-by-case determination 
would be a better response to the problem of factually determin-
ing residency, obvious questions of degree are presented. The pat-
tern of decisions can be explained, however, by plausible answers 
to those questions. In nandis, freezing non-resident tuition status 
forever went beyond the problems posed by the indeterminacy of 
student residence. In Sosna, a one-year durational residency re-
quirement responded to a legitimate concern of a state that it not 
become a divorce mill through invocation of its judicial process by 
non-citizens physically present in the state for a brief period. 
Given the less likely scenario that many false claims of residency 
will be made to qualify to vote, a briefer durational residency test 
is required in voting cases. 
My conclusion-that durational residency requirements for 
state benefits and services are permissible only to the extent they 
respond to a reasonable concern for proof of domiciliary intent-
is not an automatic litmus paper test for resolution of all cases. It 
is a cleaner inquiry than the ones suggested by present doctrine, 
and would place the constitutional right of equal state citizenship 
in its proper perspective. 
27. The Court in Sobel distinguished Starns v. Malkerson, 401 U.S. 985 (1971). see 
supra note 8, on the ground that one-year durational residency requirements for in-state 
university tuition are tests of bona fide residence. 102 S. Ct. at 2315 n.l3. The statement in 
the text, and the hypothesis of this article, are supported by the decision in Martinez v. 
Bynum, 103 S. Ct. 1883 ( 1983 ), announced after the article was first submitted for publica-
tion. The Court upheld a Texas law, denying tuition-free admission to public schools to 
minors, living apart from a parent or guardian, whose presence in the school district was 
primarily for the purpose of attending school. Justice Powell's opinion for the Court relied 
on a dictum from V/andis that a state can "establish such reasonable criteria for in-state 
status as to make virtually certain that students who are not. in fact, bona fide residents of 
the State, but who have come there solely for educational purposes. cannot take advantage 
of the in-state rates." 412 U.S. at 453-54. Justice Powell drew a general conclusion from 
that dictum: "A bona fide residence requirement. appropriately defined and uniformly 
applied, furthers the substantial state interest in assuring that services provided for its resi-
dents are enjoyed only by residents." 103 S. Ct. at 1842. 
